
LA Metro's Red Line Station |
Construction of the 7.1-km-(4.4-mile-) long Phase 1 of Los Angeles
Metro’s Red Line rapid transit system involved significant
groundwater problems, but only in about 20 percent of its length—that
portion traversing the Los Angeles River flood plain. Here, the
coarse-grained fill and river alluvium combined with a high water
table and potential for recharge created the need for stringent
groundwater control measures. The problem was intensified by the
presence of sulfides in the water that release enough hydrogen sulfide
upon depressurization to be considered a noxious atmospheric contaminant.
Regulatory agencies would not permit the pumped water from excavation
to be put back into the ground in a closed loop (when you take it
out of the ground, it becomes yours) or discharged into the river
without its being treated to remove the sulfides. The problem groundwater
affected three construction contracts and had the potential to introduce
some interesting contingencies into three different bids, so the
owner chose to handle a large part of the pollution personally by
constructing and operating a 26-million-liter (7-million-gallon)
per-day water treatment plant to remove the offending substance.
Each of the three contractors was permitted to use this facility
to treat the products from the pumps, though each was subject to
certain restrictions.
Groundwater Control Options
Of the three flood plain construction sections, contract A135 had
the most obvious immediate problems to overcome. A135 was designed
as a subway station to provide a connection between the new system
and AMTRAK’s existing Union Station. As such, A135 would have
to cross a number of active tracks and roadways and keep them functioning
throughout construction. The cut-and-cover dewatering and support
design was also affected by the owner’s stipulation that the
A135 contractor bear costs of chemical treatment for any dewatering
flows that exceeded 1.14 million liter (300,000 gallons) per day.
The bidding options were:
- Soldier piles and lagging (a porous system with obvious groundwater
treatment ramifications).
- A structural slurry wall system to provide support and exclude
much of the groundwater from the excavation. More than a slurry
trench cutoff, this option would have to be a continuous diaphragm
wall designed for structural load bearing as well as seepage control.
The contractor chose the slurry wall option and proceeded to construct
what at the time (January to December, 1989) was probably a record
breaker for depth in difficult ground. At an elevation of + 70 m
(230 feet), the Metro Rail Union Station excavation invert was overlain
by up to 18.9 m (62 feet) of overburden, including a 6.9-m- (20-foot-)
thick cobbly and bouldery layer.
With conventional dewatering, the water table would have had to
be drawn down from its normal elevation of +76.8 m (252 feet) and
maintained at a minimum of 1.2 m (4 feet) below bottom of excavation.
Complete water cutoff (and structural support for the weights and
earth pressures involved) was the aim, so the slurry walls had to
be excavated deep enough to be socketed a minimum of 0.9 m (3 feet)
into the underlying Puente “soft bedrock,” an essentially
impervious silt/clay shale with unconfined compressive strength
of 1379 kPa to 2069 kPa (200 psi to 300 psi). The undulating top
of rock varied from 26 m to 30 m (86 to 98 feet) below ground surface
and embedments were sometimes as great as 2.7 m (9 feet), so slurry
wall depths greater than 30 m (100 feet) were not uncommon.
Design and Construction
The slurry wall was designed by the contractor from criteria provided
in the bid documents, which included stipulations for a construction
sequence that satisfied the railroad owner’s requirements
for non-interruption of track yard activities. These stipulations
caused a certain amount of skipping around during emplacement of
slurry wall panels, which would not have been the case in most situations.
The support and maintenance of one active railroad bridge, one roadway
bridge, and two passenger bridges over the subway excavation had
to be provided for.
Except for the skipping around and the extraordinarily deep penetration
through difficult ground, the A135 slurry wall construction proceeded
in a fairly normal manner. The contractor erected a small on-site
batch plant to prepare the bentonite-water slurry used to support
the panel slots during excavation. This was followed by the construction
of lightly reinforced cast-in-place concrete guide walls to guide
the clam shells during excavation. Two specially constructed clam
shell buckets were manipulated by 136-Mg (150-ton) cranes as the
panel excavations proceeded downward, all the time supported by
a full head of bentonite slurry. The buckets were extra robust with
cutting edges configured to penetrate soft rock, 0.7-m-(29-inch-)
wide and with a capacity of 10.9-Mg (12-ton).
As excavation proceeded, steel reinforcing cages were fabricated
in an adjacent work area. Each consisted of a double mat of #10
reinforcing bars spaced vertically and #8 and #5 bars spaced horizontally
on 0.3-m (12-inch) centers. Sleeves were provided at pre-determined
locations to accommodate the later installation of tie-back anchors.
The reinforcing steel cages averaged 24 m (80 feet) in depth and
were normally installed in 6-m and 18-m (20-foot and 60-foot) lengths
spliced together during installation.
As is typical, the 5.5-m-(18-foot-) wide by 0.8-m-(30-inch) thick
slurry wall panels were constructed in an alternating pattern for
a so called primary and secondary panel sequencing. The lowering
of each reinforcement cage into its slot was preceded by the installation
of end-stops that had a V-notch keyway set into the slurry panel
to effect the interlocking of the primary and secondary panels.
The 27 580 kPa (4,000 psi) slurry wall concrete was placed by the
tremie method through a pipe whose tip was kept constantly immersed
at least 1.5 m (5 feet) below the surface of the accumulating deposit.
The bentonite slurry, which up to that time was supporting the slot
excavation, was displaced by the tremie concrete and recirculated
into holding tanks for future use. The aforementioned metal end-stops
were gradually pulled after the cast-in-place concrete had achieved
its initial set. The final wall contained 174 individual panels
enclosing the 442-m- (1,450-foot-) long Metro Rail station.
The need to maintain an unencumbered work site mandated that the
slurry walls be supported, not with internal struts, but with tiebacks
installed as the main trench was excavated. Tieback installations
contained from 6 to 13 anchor cables tensioned to 1113 kN to 1780
kN (250 kips to 400 kips), and were spaced on 4.6-m (15-foot) vertical
centers. They were inclined downwards at 20 to 30 degrees from the
horizontal and installed to depths of 14 m to 18 m (45 feet to 60
feet). Grouting was accomplished with a 27 580 kPa (4,000 psi) mix.
One final peculiarity of the subway necessitated some finishing
touches that would not have been required in a more routine installation.
It had been determined that the entire system of tunnels would be
lined with a 100-mil thick layer of high density polyethylene (HDPE)
to keep the emissions from gassy ground from leaking into the completed
structure. It was realized, of course, that such a lining would
also contribute to the water tightness of the tunnels in the post
construction phases. The need to install this lining on a relatively
smooth surface required some extra finishing on the interior faces
of the slurry wall panels. (Without the HDPE, the final station
walls would simply have been cast directly against the irregularities
of the slurry panels.) Also, the protruding heads of the tiebacks
provided obvious pathways for leakage and had to be covered by pre-designed
HDPE “hats” or “boots” heat welded to the
main membrane.
Complete groundwater control required that the contractor install
four dewatering wells inside the excavation. These wells served
two purposes:
- The initial lowering of the groundwater while the slurry wall
was being constructed
- The final dewatering inside the box after the wall was completed.
Readings from observation wells inside and outside the completed
box indicated that a greater than 6-m (20-foot) head differential
was maintained through the use of the slurry wall. As of September,
1990 (when I left the project) the A135 construction area remained
completely free of water.
Conclusion
Slurry walls are not appropriate for all situations requiring groundwater
control because of the expense and difficulty of installation. It
is often less expensive to simply pump out the water and dispose
of it in a storm drain or water way. The slurry wall comes into
its own, however, when it is desirable both to control groundwater
and to provide a tremendously stiff support system that minimizes
ground movements. For example, it is a fairly common way of avoiding
expensive underpinning of adjacent structures, underpinning that
might be necessitated by the use of a much more flexible soldier
pile and lagging support system.
In the case of Contract A135, the slurry wall’s robustness
greatly simplified the task of supporting heavily loaded passenger
trains and other vehicles as they continued to cross the subway
excavation on a daily basis. Considering Metro Rail’s successful
co-existence with a functioning AMTRAK station and the absolute
minimization of leakage, there is every indication that the A135
contractor chose the best option for his system of support and groundwater
control. |
PB is a member of the Engineering Management
Consultant team (EMC) joint venture including Daniel, Mann, Johnson
& Mendenhall, Icf Kaiser Engineers, Escudero-Fribourg Architects,
Jenkins Gales Martinez, Inc., and The Nettleship Group, Inc.
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