Engineers in Britain have a great respect for our predecessors of the late 18th and 19th centuries. Many completed successful projects can be seen to this day—Brunel senior’s tunnel under the Thames that joins Rotherhithe to Wapping, Brunel junior’s suspension bridge over the river Avon at Clifton, and Telford’s aqueducts on the Ellesmere Canal at Chirk and Pontcysyllte. Among these great works is a national landmark in the progress of human civilization—the mechanized railway. In 1804, Richard Trevithick built the first steam locomotive for use on what had formerly been a horse-drawn railway in Wales.

Engineers were quick to see the promise of a relatively low-cost but high-powered form of land transportation. Invention followed invention and, with great speed, railway followed railway. In the first half of the 19th century the British government authorized the building of over 400 railways.

George Stephenson, the subsequently famous engineer who supplied the locomotives for several of the railways, became concerned about the lack of some form of railway safety assessment after the first fatal accident occurred in 1830. He wrote to the president of the Board of Trade proposing the appointment of a government safety assessor. By taking this step, he planted the seed of safety regulation of railways.

Regulation in the Past

In 1840, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Frederic Smith of the Royal Engineers was appointed Inspector General of Railways at the Board of Trade. He and his colleagues carried out inspections of new railways and recommended to the Board of Trade whether or not they were fit for public use. It is interesting to note that in the last five months of 1840 there were 28 train accidents and 22 fatalities. Two years later, with more miles of track added, only 10 accidents occurred with only one fatality. Inspection appears to have had the desired effect.

The powers of the Railway Inspectorate were extended gradually, and came to include extensions and modifications to the infrastructure of railways (legally expressed as “new or altered works”). Rolling stock was not included until much later. The inspectorate was also permitted to conduct inquiries into reported railway accidents, make recommendations, and receive and analyse accident data.

A major change in safety regulation occurred in 1975 when the Railway Inspectorate took on the additional responsibility of enforcing the relevant provisions of the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974. This act required the prevention of risks to workers, passengers and members of the public. It gave the inspectorate, for the first time, the authority to inspect operational railways and enforce risk prevention actions by issuing improvement and prohibition notices, and to prosecute.

At the time of this change the main rail network was owned and operated by the British Railways Board, the one body that controlled all aspects of safety on its network. The main function of the inspectorate was to regulate this body.

Privatisation Regulations

In the early 1990s the government began preparing for privatisation of the main railway network. It sought advice from the Health & Safety Commission (HSC) which, in 1993, produced a report entitled “‘Ensuring Safety on Britain’s Railways.” On the assumption that, for the first time, the role of the train operator was to be separated from that of the infrastructure controller, the HSC recommended that new regulations would be required to ensure that existing standards of safety were maintained. They also recommended the introduction of a “safety case” regime in which train and station operators and infrastructure controllers would have to declare their safety policies and objectives, and their means for achieving them. Moreover, HSC recommended that close attention be paid to the competence and fitness of staff that carry out safety critical duties. In all, more than 30 recommendations were made and all were adopted at the time of privatisation (in accordance with the Railways Act 1993) in 1994.

The first branch of safety legislation introduced to facilitate railway privatisation, all under the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974, included:

• Railways (Safety Case) Regulations 1994*
• Railways (Safety Critical Work) Regulations 1994*
• Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail Regulations 1994.

Related changes were made to the Railways and Other Transport Systems (Approval of Works, Plant and Equipment) Regulations 1994, which come under the Transport and Works Act 1992, and, soon after, to the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 that are covered by the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974.

The Transport Act 2000 made some changes to the overall regulatory framework, most importantly by establishing the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) that now embodies the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising that was established by the Railways Act 1993.

The Regulators (in 2002)

The British railway industry has effectively three regulators who work together to ensure the success of the privatised railway industry—the Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR), SRA, and HSC and HSE.

Office of the Rail Regulator. ORR is involved primarily with setting fair commercial standards and principles among the parties in the industry, and subsequent monitoring and enforcement. Railtrack, the main network (infrastructure) controller, is regulated by ORR. If safety interests arise in adjudication of disputes (e.g., concerning Railway Group Standards), then ORR seeks Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate’s (HMRI’s) advice.

Strategic Rail Authority. The SRA is the key public sector partner in the railway industry, which is essentially a private-public partnership. It is required to provide a strategy for the use and development of railways as a whole, including both passenger and freight operations. SRA embodies the Office of the Passenger Rail Franchising Director (OPRAF), which is concerned primarily with the letting of franchises for passenger train services and the subsequent monitoring and enforcement of operational standards. If safety matters arise through requirements and commitments built into the franchising agreements, the Director seeks HMRI’s advice.

Health and Safety Commission and Health and Safety Executive. The HSC was established in 1974 as a public body of 10 people appointed by The Secretary of State for the Environment after consultation with organisations representing employers, employees, local authorities and other relevant interests. The HSE is the operating arm of the HSC. HSE executes tasks and duties on HSC’s behalf and makes arrangements for the enforcement of health and safety legislation. HMRI is part of the Operations Group of HSE with specific responsibility for the railway industry.

Operational, Technical and Safety Standards

HMRI’s Railway Safety Principles and Guidance. HMRI publishes a series of booklets entitled Railway Safety Principles and Guidance that have their origin in a memorandum of 1858. The latest version of this booklet was prepared to suit the privatised industry structure. Issued in 1996/97, the new documentation was based upon modern governmental principles of goal-setting, rather than a prescriptive approach. In addition to extensive revision and enlargement of its contents, (e.g., rolling stock is now included for the first time), the new documentation comprises two parts:

• Part 1 sets out 33 main safety principles related to safe operation and control, level crossings, electric traction systems, signalling systems, trains, station platforms and depots. This level of advice is sufficient for most of the railway industry’s major players with appropriate competence and resource to develop many of their own standards.
• Part 2 provides guidance and advice on how the principles may be implemented. It consists of eight booklets, each covering a specific topic and giving examples of acceptable good practice.

Railway Group Standards. Railtrack’s Railway Safety Case requires all operators on its infrastructure to comply with a series of Railway Group Standards that cover all operational, technical, and safety aspects. Railway Safety, a Railtrack subsidiary but independent company, manages the development of these standards, which is done through subject committees of appropriate industry and supporting experts. All operators (as members of the “Railway Group”) have the right to propose inputs to new standards and amendments to existing ones.

These Railway Group Standards build on the HMRI principles and, where appropriate, guidance. They provide one acceptable alternative to the Part 2, HMRI Guidance booklets, and company specifications can be developed from them. HMRI is also included in the consultation process of new and amended Railway Group Standards and for any proposed withdrawals.

Approvals

The current legal requirements governing approvals are set out in the Railways and Other Transport Systems (Approval of Works, Plant, and Equipment) Regulations 1994, which require railway operators to gain approval from HSE through HMRI before bringing any new and altered railway works, plant and equipment into use. The regulations are based as far as possible on previous practice, but now extend to cover all new or altered works, plant and equipment (such as signalling equipment) that are capable of materially affecting the safety of operations of the railway, as well as locomotives and rolling stock.

The regulations provide for type approval, which is principally intended for signalling equipment, rolling stock, and similar plant or equipment that is to be manufactured in quantity. Applications for type approval are considered only on the basis of a documented programme of safety assessment. This programme is often referred to as a safety case, but it should not be confused with the Railway Safety Cases described below.

For rolling stock approvals, HMRI works closely with Railtrack and its Rolling Stock Approval Board. Reports from this body and Zonal Safety Review Groups are studied by HMRI to avoid duplication of effort in the approval process. HMRI alone, however, has responsibilities for safety aspects of the interior of vehicles. Independent third-party assessment is now commonplace in rolling stock approval practice. It may also be required for the assessment of complex safety critical systems.

There is a simplified procedure of self-certification for minor works, such as minor alterations to track layouts (other than the replacement of a double junction with a single-lead junction or the removal of catch points), the transfer of control from one signal box-signalling centre to another without alterations to the interlocking arrangements, and the removal or inhibition of signalled routes.

Approval is not required for maintenance and repair of existing works or equipment. In addition, some very minor works are not considered to need approval, for example the repositioning of any signal to facilitate improved sighting.

General Legal Obligations

Many legal obligations related to health and safety apply to all employers. Foremost is the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and regulations made thereunder, which include:

• Management of Health and Safety at Work (MHSW) Regulations 1992
• The rest of the “six-pack” of regulations based on European directives
• Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Regulations 1994
• Electricity at Work Regulations 1989
• Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994.

The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) 1995 contains the requirements to report certain categories of railway accident. The HSE publishes a guidance document on these regulations for the railway industry. The Factories Act 1961 (and regulations made thereunder) and the Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963 are other pieces of general legislation, with which railway companies may need to be particularly concerned.

Safety Critical Work

The Railways (Safety Critical Work) Regulations 1994 put responsibilities on railway companies in respect of competence, fitness, training, record keeping and identification for employees involved in the:

• Movement, coupling or uncoupling of trains
• Checking of vehicles before use
• Maintenance of infrastructure.

The regulations also refer to hours of work, for which there is an Approved Code of Practice. Operators on Railtrack’s infrastructure are expected to follow current limits that were passed down from British Rail on the maximum lengths of any period of duty, minimum intervals between duties, maximum number of hours worked in a seven-day period and the minimum frequency of rest days. Any changes that an operator may wish to introduce have to be validated by a risk assessment process to demonstrate that they are not expected to cause fatigue and likely endanger safety. Where changes are appropriate, they have to be introduced in a gradual, properly controlled manner, and the results monitored.

Railway Safety Case System

A train operating company’s railway safety case is essentially a formal statement of how that operator manages both its internal health and safety issues, and those relating to the various interfaces it has within the railway industry and with other bodies (Railtrack, fellow train operators, and station operators whose facilities it uses or, if a station operator, other train operators using its stations).

Railtrack’s own railway safety case has been accepted by HMRI. An important part, particularly as far as HMRI was concerned during the assessment and acceptance process, was that which related to:

• The principles and procedures Railtrack had to adopt in assessing the railway safety cases of train and station operators
• Railtrack’s proposals for monitoring and auditing the performance of such companies.

Until recently, Railtrack, as infrastructure controller, had the responsibility of accepting railway safety cases for all train operators on its infrastructure and, generally, for station operators where Railtrack was the freeholder of the station concerned. Recent changes to regulations governing railway safety cases, however, now require the HSE (in practice, HMRI) to make the final judgment on all railway safety cases.

Implications for the Industry

The main implications for the railway industry of the various points made above can be summarised as follows:

• Railtrack’s Role. Railtrack, currently under administration and possibly destined to become a not-for-profit company, is the owner of Britain’s rail network including virtually all stations, hence, it is the national infrastructure controller. In spite of damaging criticism in the Hatfield accident report, Railtrack remains a key player in the maintenance of railway safety. Inquiry reports following recent railway accidents make recommendations that place direct responsibility on Railtrack to bring about a significant improvement in the safety situation. Railtrack must be expected to provide direction for the industry towards a safer future.
• Inspection and Enforcement. HMRI’s inspection and enforcement policies and processes are of fundamental significance to the achievement of continual improvement in UK railway safety.
• Safety Critical Work. Safety critical work is an area that will be particularly monitored by both Railtrack and HMRI in respect of staff’s competence, fitness and training; drugs and alcohol policies; hours of work; etc. Management of safety at the interfaces in the industry must also be given particular attention.
• Cooperation and Communication. There has to be strong cooperation among all members of the railway industry if safety is to be maintained. Communications are important within companies and with other members of the railway group, the regulatory bodies, and emergency services.
• Hours of Work. Maximum hours of work are rigidly defined currently, but the expectation is that operators will wish to conduct their own or joint research programmes in accordance with HSE’s Approved Code of Practice in order to achieve greater flexibility of the workforce.
• Commitment to the Safety Plan. Each and every railway operator needs to be fully committed to the Railway Group Safety Plan as a key element in continuously improving safety throughout the industry under the as-low-as-reasonably-practical (ALARP) principle.¹
• Operator Involvement. Both the Railway Group Safety Plan and the Railway Group Standards system present opportunities for operators to contribute at the formulation stages.

The Future for Railway Safety

In each of the last five years there has been a fatal train accident on Britain’s railways. Each accident has been followed by an inquiry and each time many recommendations to improve safety (93 for Southall, 89 for Ladbroke Grove) have been made.

Why should this be when the network has been operating for many decades? Has an essential baby (management know-how, safety culture, engineering expertise) been thrown out with the privatisation bathwater? Time of course will tell. On the main question of “will safety on Britain’s railways now start to improve?” the signs are not encouraging in my opinion. In any case, there is still a long way to go.